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Abstract: This paper argues that homeowners, if su￿ciently in￿uential, may at-
tempt to manipulate housing prices. The paper presents an instance of, and sets out
the political economy behind, one particular homeowner-made housing price bubble
(in East Germany). Yet ultimately the paper suggests that homeowners may be
responsible for housing price bubbles elsewhere, too. Namely, US homeowners may
be the single driving force behind the latest US housing price boom that preceded
the current real estate, and ￿nancial, crisis.
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are mine.1 Introduction
Many di￿erent explanations have been suggested to explain the US housing price
boom that preceded the current crisis: loose monetary policy, ￿nancial markets’
deregulation, and subprime lending among them. However, could it not be that
these explanations all go back to a single driving force behind them? Maybe, so one
might surmise, it is US homeowners (a majority of the US electorate) who explicitly
encouraged loose monetary policy, ￿nancial deregulation, and excessive subprime
lending. In so doing, US homeowners in the end may have generated the massive
surge in house prices.
Establishing such a link must be challenging enough, of course. Not just would
one need to explain why rational homeowners stimulate housing prices if they are
not also able to sustain them. Also, a full political economy model would have to
explain how homeowners exert political in￿uence in the various policy ￿elds. Instead
of taking on this task this paper turns to a more modest one. This paper addresses
homeowners’ role in generating, and maintaining, a housing price bubble in East
Germany. While institutions there clearly are very di￿erent from those in the US,
the idea of homeowners actively steering housing prices (when su￿ciently in￿uential)
may nonetheless shine through strongly enough to merit attention elsewhere, too.
At the outset, note that East Germany’s rent is almost as large as West Germany’s.
At the same time one sixth of the Eastern housing stock (or, for the unfamiliar
reader, roughly one million apartments) are vacant. From this paper’s perspective,
East Germany’s rent represents a ￿bubble￿, and an unburst one at that. This inter-
pretation is novel to the discussion of East Germany’s rent. To sociologists, economic
geographers and urban planners, current East German rent does not appear partic-
ularly large. To these observers current rent merely re￿ects suppliers’ need to repay
the cost of modernizing the Eastern housing stock, following the German Democratic
Republic’s demise in 1989.
Yet sunk modernization investment surely cannot explain current rent. This paper
o￿ers an alternative, political economy type explanation. In essence, this explana-
tion proceeds in two steps. First, for legal reasons modernizing the East German
stock early on translated into larger rent. Then those East German renters who felt
that modernization brings them little bene￿t must have preferred to become home-
owners in response, or even to leave for Germany’s West altogether. Given that
modernization was intense, a homeowner majority emerged in Germany’s East. This
homeowner majority now opposes ever reducing rent below the ￿cost covering￿ level,
for fear of having to contribute to the de￿cit that would inevitably result if rent fell.
And second, fear of having to contribute to modernization cost may even explain
modernization itself. Germany’s, as opposed to East Germany’s, electorate must
have been reluctant to settle on a degree of Eastern modernization inconsistent with
homeowner majority there. Moderate modernization would have left East Germany’s
renters, rather than her homeowners, in control. So Germany’s electorate early on
1may have ￿xed modernization at a far larger level (at the minimum level necessary
to ensure homeowner majority in the East, to be precise). This larger level, and
this level only, could ensure not having to contribute to the de￿cit that would have
resulted otherwise.
The paper’s equilibrium closely corresponds to what can be observed today: Modern-
ization is intense, homeownership one half, vacant housing vast, and high rent per-
sistent. High rent is persistent because East Germany’s surge in the homeownership
rate acts like a ratchet, ￿petrifying￿ rent. To emphasize, this surge in homeownership
is far from being accidental. Instead, it is the intended outcome of a modernization
strategy which puts East Germany’s homeowners in charge of safeguarding cost cov-
ering rent.
As much as 40% of Eastern rental housing is public. At the surface, this may answer
the question of why there is no downward price adjustment by pointing to a lack of
competition. Yet this immediately raises another, and key to this paper. Why do
local governments not make their public housing corporations reduce local rent (in
particular in view of the likelihood that a sizeable fraction of the resulting de￿cit
may be picked up by tax payers throughout Germany)? Why do neither political
parties, nor media, nor renters’ associations voice any protest?
As a little ￿￿eld experiment￿ in policy advice, two articles in one of Germany’s
national dailies (Dascher/Ribhegge (2005) and Dascher (2008)) have proposed to
lower rent. While expecting a substantial response would surely have been naive,
observing the zero response there was was equally surprising. Zero response would
be consistent with (non-economic) explanations based on voter indi￿erence to, or
on voter belief in the irrelevance of, falling rent. But zero response would also be
consistent with a political equilibrium in which a majority defend high rent against
any local proposal to abandon it while the corresponding minority do not protest
because they understand the futility of protesting against a decision taken by the
median. It is such an equilibrium that is at the heart of the paper.
This equilibrium also clari￿es why any suggestion to reduce rent today, if only by a
little amount, must fail. East Germany’s homeowners must fear any small reduction
in rent for two reasons. Their ￿rst fear must be that a small reduction in Eastern
rent will move Eastern public housing into de￿cit (discussed above). Yet there even
is an added fear over and above this standard caveat of policy reform. Homeowners’
second fear must be that a small reduction in rent will attract renters from elsewhere,
thus shifting the balance of power in East back to Eastern renters. Modest looking
reductions in Eastern rent may quickly accelerate into fearsome reductions in Eastern
rent.
Let us brie￿y look into the triple facts on rent, vacancies, and homeownership. Note
that these facts are not stylized; rarely do simple data speak out so clearly. At
reuni￿cation East’s average rent was very low.2 But as early as 2002 it had almost
2Following Housing Commission (1995), East’s 1990 rent averaged (in 1990 prices) 70 cents/sqm.
22002 2006
West Germany 5.9 6.1
East Germany 5.2 5.6
Table 1: Average Rent per sqm [e] (Timm (2008), Table 6)
risen to the then-prevailing level in West (Table 1).3 At the same time excess supply
in Eastern housing grew rapidly, to the extent that roughly one sixth of all Eastern
housing had become vacant by 2002 (Table 2). By 2006 the vacancy rate had dropped
to 12 percent, yet surely would have exceeded one sixth had it not been for the
demolition of close to a quarter of a million apartments in the intervening years.
This coincidence, of vast tracts of vacant housing with rent nearing the West German
level, motivates the paper’s view that Eastern rent today is excessive.
2002 2006
West Germany 3.2
East Germany 16.2 12.4
Table 2: Vacancy Rate [%] (GdW (2006))
Rising rent has induced many of East’s households to acquire a home of their own.
This rise in the homeownership rate has reinforced the ranks of those who should op-
pose any fall in rent. Table 3 documents the rapid increase in East’s homeownership
rate, up from app. 28% in 1993 to over 39% by 2003. While it is true that homeown-
ers do not constitute a majority of the East German electorate, they certainly have
come very close to constituting one. Throwing in the fact that Germany’s home-
owners are more likely to vote (Glaeser/diPasquale (1999)) suggests that the median
voter is a homeowner.4 Within a median voter framework, any policy proposal to
reduce rent would fail in the political arena.
Standard comments on East Germany’s housing argue that reuni￿cation has driven
emigration from Germany’s East.5 Reducing rent would not hold emigrants back.
3A similar picture emerges when consulting average rents documented by the German SocioE-
conomic Panel (SOEP) as in Dascher (2008a), or when looking at anecdotal evidence collected at
the local level (e.g., Klupp et al. (2004)).
4One might argue that, following Table 3, in 2003 the national homeownership rate had bypassed
the critical level, too, after having dropped below it due to reuni￿cation. This may be useful in
explaining recent swings in policies relevant to real estate, such as tax breaks for commuters.
5What is referred to as the standard model here in fact is a collection of views held by regional
planners and economic geographers. BMVBS (2006), GdW (2007) and Bernt (2009), while di￿ering
31993 2003
West Germany 50.5 51.1
East Germany 27.7 39.1
Table 3: Homeownership Rate [%] (Kott/Krebs 2004, Table 3)
Instead, reducing rent could even endanger funding further, and badly needed, im-
provements in the housing stock. Here we completely reverse this link between
migration and rent. Following this paper, large Eastern rent is an important driver
of emigration and vacant housing.6 Improvements in the housing stock, while costly,
bene￿t residents little and hence only increase the pressure to leave. These di￿erent
views on causality extend to di￿erent views on the role of homeownership. Follow-
ing the standard model, large homeownership is bene￿cial. Following this paper, in
contrast, it is the very coalition of Eastern homeowners that prevents public housing
rent from falling.
Section 2 sets out the e￿ect of modernization on the homeownership rate in East
Germany. Section 3 explains the simultaneous interaction between the homeowner-
ship rate on the one hand and the politics of Eastern rent on the other hand. Section
4 extends discussion to the extent of modernization, and also considers comparative
statics of equilibrium. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
This section describes households’ simultaneous choice of how to be housed and where
to live. There are two regions, Germany’s East and her West. Variables relating to
West (East) are given in capital letters (small type); while variables pertaining to
both regions are given in small type throughout. East’s (West’s) household total is
l (L), and total population l + L equals one.
Re￿ecting the two Germanys’ very di￿erent histories, ownership of rental housing
follows a simple rule. Rental housing in West is equally distributed among home-
owners in West, and thus ￿private￿; while rental housing in East is owned by East’s
government, and ￿public￿ hence.7 Regional wages in East and West are w and W,
while regional lump sum taxes needed to ￿nance regional public goods in East and
in details, give a fairly representative summary of these views.
6Simon/Namura (2009) even ￿nd that living in more expensive regions actually reduces fertility.
From this perspective, large Eastern rent contributes to vacant housing also by aggravating the
ongoing demographic crisis.
7This rule excludes the potentially important case of homeowners in West owning homes in East.
Yet in fact including this case strengthens the model’s results (section 5).
4West are t and T, respectively. Wages and public goods are exogenous. In particular,
neither does the regional wage fall should the region’s population rise nor do regional
public goods exhibit any rivalry in consumption.8
Households in East take as given modernization. Let c represent the cost of main-
taining one apartment. Further, let r denote the rent that just covers maintenance
and modernization cost. That is, r is ￿cost rent￿. This paper’s cost rent simply is the
smallest among all rents permitting housing investors to recover their investment.
Fundamentally, cost rent r certainly need not coincide with true rent r. Moreover,
observe that modernization investment (r   c) is irreversible. These sunk costs play
an important role below. Sunk costs reduce society’s consumption set, initiating a
distributional struggle over who contributes least to this reduction.
Households in East may choose between three di￿erent actions. They may stay in
East and rent an apartment there; they may stay in East and buy a home; or they
may move into rental housing in West. Households, however, may not buy a home
in West.9 Next, households di￿er in their mobility to move across regions (mobility
cost) and in their bene￿t from living in a house of their own (homeowning talent).
Speci￿cally, households are uniformly distributed with respect to mobility cost m
and homeowning talent z, with (m;z) 2 [0;m]  [0;z], where m;z > 0. To be sure,
homeowning talent may alternatively also be interpreted as an individual distaste
for residing in rental housing.
Homes are supplied by a competitive fringe of developers, at price p, and public
rental housing is supplied at cost rent, r. Let  be a dummy variable that assumes
the value of 1 if Eastern voters lower public housing rent, and 0 otherwise. Observe
that lowering public housing rent will move East into de￿cit. Financial reserves
absent, this amounts to defaulting on (part of) modernization debt. Below we will
restrict attention to the case where Eastern rent is lowered right down to operating
cost.10 Let  denote the cost of default to any citizen should East default.11 Surely
even in the case of default Eastern renters may still be held liable for some fraction
 of modernization cost.
While improvements in Eastern public rental housing quality certainly should make
residents better o￿ there are two reasons why this ultimately may not translate into
higher utility. First, public housing residents are likely to su￿er when confronted with
the true cost of these improvements, as is well known from the literature on public
8Neoclassical theory would suggest that wages should fall following immigration, while a new
economic geography model accounting for agglomeration economies might suggest that wages could
even rise. Assuming constant wages amounts to choosing middle ground between the two extremes.
9This assumption relies on the idea that buying a house in a region one is not familiar with
simply is too costly. The assumption, to be sure, is important and underlies many of the paper’s
results.
10If a majority of households decide on lowering rent, then they might as well lower rent as much
as they can (section 4).
11Then, as is obvious from (1),  does not distort households’ choices between the di￿erent
options.
5housing (e.g., Olsen (1983)).12 This must be particularly true for East Germany’s
slab type rental housing for which quality improvements are limited from the start.
Even when modernized these ￿ats continue to not be soundproof, to su￿er from
monotonous views, etc. If tenants are forced to pay the true cost of the extra quality
imposed on them then they are made worse o￿, to the extent that some of them either
leave for Germany’s West or move into housing of their own. And, from a somewhat
di￿erent perspective, second, we may view East Germany’s modernization endeavor
as an attempt to make Eastern housing satisfy higher, i.e. West German, standards.
Satisfying these standards can be very costly yet need not generate substantial bene-
￿ts to tenants never involved in the decision on which standards actually are adequate
for them.
For these two reasons, and for modeling simplicity, we completely drop housing
quality from our description of indirect utility from Eastern rental housing. (Al-
ternatively, public housing rent r may be thought of as capturing the net e￿ect of
quality and concomitant cost rent.) Depending on location and tenure choice Eastern
household’s utilities are
U =
8
<
:
v(g) + w   t   p + z     buying
v(g) + w   t   r   (   (1   )(r   c)) renting
V (G) + W   T   R   m     emigrating
(1)
Note that improved public housing quality in East does not explicitly enter into
utility when renting. And, throughout this section  and r are given. The following
two sections then take up the issue of endogenous  and r.
Households indi￿erent between the two modes of tenure exhibit homeowning talent
z of
e z(r;) = p   r + (1   )(r   c) (2)
where e z, a function of r and , is just so written. Figure 1’s panel (a) graphs e z(r;)
for given r = r0 and  = 0. (The parts of the graph that are not relevant below are
suppressed.) Ceteris paribus, increasing r or decreasing  shifts the locus downwards.
This must conform with intuition. Renting becomes ever less attractive the more
intensive (useless) modernization becomes, and the less probable default is.
Households indi￿erent between staying a renter in East and moving into rental hous-
ing in West exhibit migration costs m of
e m(r;) =  + (r   R)   (1   )(r   c) (3)
after setting  = (V (G)   v(g)) + (W   T)   (w   t), representing West’s gross
advantage. Figure 1’s panel (a) also illustrates the graph of e m(r;), again for r = r0
and  = 0. Holding everything else equal, this locus clearly shifts to the right as
either r rises or  falls. Here, too, the intuition is clear. Greater modernization
12H￿bl/M￿ller (1996, p. 69) provide an early comparison of modernization costs with willingness-
to-pay, and caution against overly ambitious modernization.
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e m(r0;0)
(b) Rising Cost Rent in East
Figure 1: Illustrating Household Allocation
￿ through the greater expected burden anticipated to come along with it ￿ makes
individuals more inclined to head o￿ to West.
The third locus represents indi￿erence between emigration to West and buying prop-
erty in East. We let b z(r;) denote critical homeowning talent in this context, with
b z(r;) = e z(r;) + e m(r;)   m. (4)
and where we make use of the de￿nitions (2) and (3) just introduced. In Figure 1’s
panel (a), b z(r;) is the downward sloping graph. This graph is not subject to any
variation in either r or .
Figure 1’s panel (a) not just points to those who want to buy property (the lightly
shaded area) and to those who prefer to rent (the not so lightly shaded area). It
also reveals the number of those wanting to leave for West (the dark shaded area),
denoted E(r;).13 Figure 1’s panel (b) then illustrates how further modernizing
public housing a￿ects the volume of emigration. Pushing r further up, to r00, shifts
the e z-locus down and the e m-locus to the right, increasing the number of those who
want to emigrate. Likewise (though not drawn), making  switch from 0 to 1 shifts
the e z-locus up, and the e m-locus to the left, clearly reducing the number of those who
want to leave. To summarize, E(r;) is increasing in r, and decreasing in .
We turn to housing supply in West. Anyone can provide an additional unit of housing
at cost d, where d > c. Western supply is perfectly elastic at d. Emigration from
East driven by increases in Eastern cost rent does not raise the equilibrium rent in
West.14
13Speci￿cally, E(r;) = e m(r;) e z(r;) + 0:5(e m(r;))
2:
14This takes away the potential incentive for Western homeowners to drive up cost rent in East in
order to raise rent in West. Incorporating the possibility that supply of Western housing to Eastern
emigrants is upward sloping would permit rent in West to rise.
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Eastern modernization’s e￿ects on local politics begin to shine through. Greater
modernization in East, so we emphasize, a￿ects Eastern politics because it biases
the Eastern electorate’s division into homeowners and renters, towards homeowners.
This section then permits Eastern politics to play an active role. Eastern voters may
not have had a say in the extent of costly modernization. Yet today they may try
to reduce Eastern rent. Hence, while it is true that the likelihood of debt default 
a￿ects households’ decisions on whether they want to stay in East and how they want
to be housed (the previous section), it must also be true that tenure and location
choices feed back into the size and composition of the Eastern electorate, and hence
into the likelihood of debt default . This section’s interest is in the analysis of this
simultaneous interaction. I.e.,  now is endogenous.
Defaulting on public housing debt implies that modernization cost of every unit still
inhabited, (r   c), will shift to the general public. Given that the number of public
housing apartments modernized are l   E(r;), every citizen needs to put in
 = (1   )(r   c)(l   E(r;)), (5)
irrespective of his residential location or housing tenure mode.15 Eastern rent now
becomes c+(1 )r, being a weighted average of maintenance cost c and full cost
rent r.
Aware that default will bene￿t them, Eastern renters will vote for it; while Eastern
homeowners, aware that defaulting on public housing debt will hurt them, will vote
against it. Di￿erent views as to who pays for modernization costs previously sunk
translate into di￿erent voting behavior across renters and owner-occupiers. With 
endogenous households continue to decide on location and mode of tenure but they
also do so bearing in mind the impact of their location and tenure decisions on the
Eastern electorate’s subsequent take on default.
In particular, households anticipate the crucial role of the homeowner share in subse-
quent regional voting on whether or not to default on public housing debt. Eastern
households cannot anticipate the location and tenure decisions all other Eastern
households take. So they enter simultaneous play. Just which type of game they
play then depends on the level of r. It turns out to be useful to distinguish between
little modernization, (r0   c) (both panels in Figure 2); intermediate modernization
(r00   c) (panels in Figure 3); and intensive modernization, (r000   c) (Figure 4).
Consider the low r scenario ￿rst. For r0 it is straightforward to indicate a Nash
equilibrium of the game. In Figure 2(a), the lightly shaded area represents those
who rent public housing in East; the heavily shaded area those who buy property in
15Alternatively we could assume that only residents in East have to carry these costs. This would
strengthen Eastern homeowners’ opposition to debt default (but it would also further distort the
migration decision).
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Figure 2: Little Modernization (r = r0)
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(b) A No-Default-Equilibrium
Figure 4: Intensive Modernization (r = r000)
9East; and the non-shaded area those who leave for West. Clearly those who rent in
East constitute a majority of those who remain in East: As drawn, the lightly shaded
area exceeds the heavily shaded area. This majority will default on modernization
investment. Then it is dashed ￿ rather than bold ￿ loci that matter. Yet given the
dashed loci no household in East will want to do anything else but what he was
assigned to do above. Figure 2(a) captures a Nash equilibrium of the game.
This equilibrium of the game is unique. Geometrically speaking, a Nash equilibrium
must satisfy the following two conditions: (i) Shaded areas that describe household
choices must align with the relevant loci. (Otherwise some household could be better
o￿ by switching to some other tenure mode or location choice.) And, (ii) relevant
loci can be found by consulting areas’ relative size. (If the heavily shaded area is
larger (smaller) than the lightly shaded one, then the bold (dashed) loci apply.)
Figure 2(b) illustrates an allocation of Eastern households for which condition (ii) is
not satis￿ed. There even more households choose to become homeowners, and even
more of those who would rent otherwise leave for West. Even though this favors the
group of homeowners in East, the resulting homeownership share still falls short of
the 50% quorum. Anticipating this, many households will want to break away.
We conclude that for r low many households emigrate and not many households buy
property, leaving the group of renters in control of the subsequent decision on whether
to reduce public housing rent or not. The resulting rent r0 becomes c + (1   )r0.
Alternatively, consider the large r scenario next (Figure 4). Similar reasoning as
above shows that for r000 the game has but one Nash equilibrium, as depicted in
Figure (5b). This equilibrium now puts homeowners in control. Equilibrium rent r000
equals cost rent, r000. Again, allocations where households make choices in line with
the ￿wrong￿ loci cannot be equilibria. (One such disequilibrium in the context of r
being large is illustrated in Figure (4a).)
At last consider the scenario of moderate modernization, where r assumes an inter-
mediate value, r00 say (Figure 3). Now Nash equilibrium is no longer unique; instead
equilibria are multiple. As drawn, Figure (3a) shows an allocation where households’
choices based on expecting default will generate a majority of voters speaking out
for default. Then equilibrium rent r00 equals c+(1 )r00. (The lightly shaded area
clearly is larger than the heavily shaded area.) Alternatively, Figure (3b) shows an
allocation where households’ choices based on expecting no default will generate a
majority of voters opposing default. (The heavily shaded area is meant to be slightly
greater than the lightly shaded area.) Then equilibrium rent r00 just equals cost rent,
r00. In either scenario no individual will want to change his mind as long as noone
else changes his.
We now make precise our distinction between low, intermediate, and large values of
r. Note ￿rst that diagrammatically East’s homeownership share is the ratio of the
heavily shaded area to the lightly shaded area. This ratio is strictly increasing, and
continuous, in r.16 Moreover, this ratio is smaller than 0.5 for r close to c while
16This is because the area in the numerator of the homeownership share is strictly increasing and
10larger than 0.5 for r su￿ciently large. But then by the intermediate value theorem
there must exist some value of r for which the homeownership share equals 0.5. This
value equates the number of homeowners (proportional to the r.h.s. of the following
equation) to the number of renters (proportional to its l.h.s.):

m   e m(r;)

e z(r;) =

z   e z(r;)

m  

e m(r;)
2.
2 (6)
making use of (2) and (3). Let r denote this critical value (of which we can be
sure that it exists). Intuitively, r proxies the minimum modernization needed to
(turn su￿cient numbers of households o￿ becoming renters in East to) make any
subsequent proposal of default fail.17 This critical value depends on . Surely r1 is
strictly smaller than r0. Intuitively, the extent of modernization needed to frighten
away su￿cient numbers of potential renters, r, must be greater if renters can be
certain to be able to default on much of the initial investment later.
Let us combine the intuition gained from the Figures with the critical values just
introduced: For r strictly smaller than r1, the only Nash-equilibrium is the one where
East defaults (Figure (2a)). Then Eastern rent is c(1   ) + r. Next, for r strictly
greater than r0, the unique Nash-equilibrium is the one where East does not default
(Figure (4b)). Here Eastern rent is r. And ￿nally, for r between the two critical
values two Nash-equilibria coexist, where Eastern rent is either c(1   ) + r or r.
To summarize more compactly,
Proposition 1 (Homeownership Rate and Debt Default) : Little (expensive)
modernization in East induces a small (large) homeownership rate in East; which in
turn makes Eastern voters’ default on modernization debt more (less) likely. Loosely
speaking, expensive ￿ and only expensive ￿ modernization pays its way.
Since (r) and r(r) assign two values to intermediate cost rents they are corre-
spondences. Whenever both, default and no default, are equilibrium outcomes then
default seems the more plausible outcome, given that historically renters predomi-
nate and cost rent is low. With this assumption the probability of East defaulting
, Eastern rent r and default tax  become
(r) =

1 if r < r0
0 if r0  r
, (7)
r(r) =

c(1   ) + r if r < r0
r if r0  r
and (8)
(r) =

 if r < r0
0 if r0  r
(9)
Eastern rent is, joint with Western rent R, sketched in Figure 5’s panel (a). It
is strictly increasing in r, and discontinuous at r0. And of course, Eastern and
continuous in r while the area in the denominator is strictly decreasing and continuous in r.
17More precisely, the modernization investment needed is given by (r   c).
11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
R
r(r)
r(r)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . . . . d
c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.


r(r);R
c r r0
(a) Rents in East and West
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
.
.
.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(r)
c r
(r)
(r)
r0


(b) Default Tax
Figure 5: Equilibrium Rents in East and West, and Default Tax
Western rent converge. The greater is cost rent, the smaller the initial advantage of
Western rent over Eastern rent becomes. Figure (5a) reveals that for r greater than
r0 Eastern cost rent is self-ful￿lling. Su￿ciently large Eastern cost rent produces
an actual Eastern rent of identical value. However, panel (a) also shows that for r
smaller than r0 Eastern cost rent will not translate into an equal sized actual rent.
Which among the many possible cost rents is the relevant one? Two interpretations
are possible. We might always argue that ￿accident￿, or ￿history￿, has ￿xed r at
some level. Since homeownership in East Germany today has e￿ectively surpassed
one half (section 1), history must have ￿xed r at some value slightly greater than,
or equal to, r0. This would explain why Eastern rent does not, and will not, fall.
The majority of the Eastern electorate today are not renting, and thus are unwilling
to contribute to the modernization cost bill. Alternatively, we might go one step
further. We might wonder whether r, rather than accidentally being set such that
homeownership attains one half, might have strategically been ￿xed by the national
electorate. The following section explores this idea.
4 Strategic Modernization and Large Rent’s Persistence
Suppose the national electorate is able to ￿x the extent of Eastern modernization,
(r   c), at reuni￿cation.18 This electorate should plan Eastern modernization care-
fully. If it imposes too little modernization investment, then even this little invest-
18In the early years following uni￿cation, public housing corporations were permitted small rent
increments only. Having had to service debt incurred during earlier German Democratic Republic
rule while at the same time being prohibited to generate any substantial revenue of their own
quickly forced local public housing corporations into de￿cit. A law introduced in response, in 1993,
the Altschuldenhilfegesetz seemingly purported to o￿er relief but e￿ectively imposed modernization.
Housing companies’ debt would partly be waived only if public housing corporations (i) quickly
modernized, and (ii) pursued fast privatization of, their stock. At the same time rents would be
allowed to rise much stronger only if matched by costly investments into satisfying higher standards.
For full details see BMJ (1993).
12ment will to a large extent be defaulted on (for failing to ensure a politically viable
homeownership rate in East), generating an additional tax burden. If, in contrast,
it imposes strong modernization then the correspondingly large investment cost will
be borne by Eastern renters only.
Figure (5b) makes the national electorate’s reasoning explicit. Note that the median
voter is a household residing in West. Suppose that this median voter must, for
constitutional reasons and in line with the reuni￿cation treaty’s stipulations, decide
on some strictly positive modernization e￿ort. Then choosing r0 certainly identi￿es
one optimal choice. No other cost rent can improve upon r0. Now, this optimum is
not unique. Any cost rent above and beyond r0 will also do, as shown in Figure (5b).
Assuming lexicographic preferences over ( ; r) on the part of Western voters will
identify r0. The majority of Western voters choose the smallest among all the cost
rents that ensure modernization debt repayment.
This equilibrium corresponds well with the homeownership share currently found in
East. If weighted by higher likelihood to turn out, East’s 40% homeowners may
command just over 50% of the votes, as predicted by the model. Second, this also
matches up with the fact that virtually no opposition contests current rents. Third,
equilibrium predicts a strong interregional convergence in rents, produced by the
strong increase in Eastern rent.19 Fourth, equilibrium exhibits a large fraction of
vacant housing, left behind by those pushed into emigrating by unnecessarily high
rent. This, too, accords well with the evidence (Table 2).20 For reference,
Proposition 2 (Modernization, Emigration, Homeownership, and Rents) :
The model’s equilibrium exhibits:
(i) (Substantial Modernization:) Western and Eastern voters jointly ￿x moderniza-
tion investment into each unit of Eastern public rental housing, at (r0   c),
(ii) (Substantial Emigration:) Eastern households with mobility cost below e m(r0;1)
and homeowning talent smaller than b z(r0;1) move into rental housing in West,
(iii) (Homeownership Share One Half:) Eastern voters, as those remaining, almost
evenly divide into homeowners and renters, with the median being a homeowner,
(iv) (Debt Default Rejection:) Eastern voters, as those remaining, strike down any
proposal to default on modernization debt,
(v) (Rent Convergence): Eastern equilibrium rent r just equals critical cost rent r0.
Eastern rent converges to the Western level, R.
Further equilibrium properties derive from varying public goods provision, introduc-
ing subsidies to homeownership, and demolishing part of the vacant, or even non-
19Figure (5a) suggests that Eastern rent falls short of Western rent. This not necessarily is the
case, Eastern rent may also exceed Western rent. As argued in the introduction, quality adjusted
average rent in Germany’s East may actually exceed that in Germany’s West (section 1).
20Reich (2000) and Steinert (2000) point to overall modernization investment into Eastern public
housing having attained 40 billion Euro by the end of 2000.
13vacant, stock.21 Consider ￿rst an increase in g, representing the huge investment
into Eastern infrastructure. Intuitively, this improvement translates into a higher
r0. The reason is that better regional public good provision in East convinces more
to reconsider their decision to leave for West, and that among those who reconsider
the share of renters is greater. But then the r0 necessary to engineer a homeowner-
ship share of one half must be higher. Since equilibrium rent equals r0 the underlying
increase in regional public goods translates into larger Eastern rent. For a region
boasting vast vacant housing such ￿capitalization￿ must be surprising.
Next, consider subsidizing homeownership. In terms of the model, this is captured
by a drop in the price of a home, p. At each level of cost rent, r, the number of
those wanting to stay and buy a house rises. Hence the critical cost rent r0 can
a￿ord to be smaller. Subsidizing homeownership reduces Eastern rent. 22 Finally, let
us turn to demolition. If demolition a￿ects vacant ￿ats only, then demolition has no
e￿ect on Eastern rent. Alternatively, once demolition turns to public housing still
partly inhabited then numerous renters are forced to move.23 Once forced to move,
those uprooted may leave altogether. Then demolition in fact reduces the number of
renters in East. For this reason equilibrium Eastern rent may fall. 24 To summarize,
Proposition 3 (Public Goods, Homeownership Subsidies, Demolition) :
Comparative Statics reveal the following changes in equilibrium values:
(i) (Public Good Improvement): Eastern rent is increasing in the regional public
good. Capitalization occurs in spite of excess housing.
(ii) (Homeownership Subsidies): Eastern rent is decreasing in the level of homeown-
ership subsidies.
(iii) (Demolition): Eastern rent is invariant to demolition of vacant apartments.
However, if demolition razes inhabited apartments also then Eastern rent falls.
In equilibrium Eastern rent cannot fall short of r0. Let us take a brief, somewhat
speculative, look beyond equilibrium. Once modernization has taken place the de-
sired homeowner majority in East emerges as planned. Consider now a small, unex-
pected reduction in Eastern rent. Such a reduction is feasible since r is administered
21These variations are treated as being expected by all those involved in equilibrium.
22Homeownership subsidies are complemented by e￿orts to privatize East Germany’s public hous-
ing stock. For instance, public housing corporations in Germany’s East would only be eligible for
federal debt relief if they would agree to privatize a certain fraction of their stock (BMF). From
a benevolent perspective, these e￿orts may simply try to enlist more households into socially pro-
ductive owner-occupiership. From this paper’s perspective, alternatively, these e￿orts may also be
interpreted as an intervention designed to reduce the critical threshold beyond which the homeowner
majority becomes certain.
23While vacant apartments cluster in particular blocks of housing, rarely are these blocks com-
pletely vacant. Demolishing them always requires expelling some renters.
24This contradicts the prediction of a ￿ltering model, in which demolition makes renters move
into the next higher segment of housing rather than leave altogether (Dascher (2008a)). In part
this di￿erence in predictions is due to an assumption in this paper, i.e. that Eastern rental housing
is only available in a single quality.
14rent in public housing. Homeowners must fear such a small reduction in rent for two
reasons.
Their ￿rst fear must be that a small reduction in Eastern rent will move Eastern
public housing into de￿cit (section 4). More pressing yet, their second fear must
be that a small reduction in rent will (i) convert Eastern homeowners into Eastern
renters as well as (ii) attract renters from Germany’s West, thus tilting the balance
of power in East towards renters and ultimately triggering further, much stronger
reductions, in rent.25 Are these fears justi￿ed? Now, with this paper’s model those
who have chosen to become homeowners earlier will not want to move back into public
rental housing since there is no one whom they could sell the house left behind.
Yet at the same time Western renters’ migration into Eastern public housing, even if
very small, may well pose a real threat to homeowner majority in Germany’s East.
Put di￿erently, while there is hysteresis in homeownership there is no hysteresis
in the homeownership rate. This means that advising a small, seemingly harmless
reduction in Eastern public housing rent faces an added di￿culty over and above
the standard pitfalls of policy reform. Not just need Eastern homeowners to be
compensated for, or kept exempt from, the losses foreseeable from public housing
de￿cits arising from lower rent. Eastern homeowners also need to be guaranteed
protection against further reductions in rent likely once homeowner majority has
eroded.26 Proposition 4 summarizes.
Proposition 4 (Hysteresis and the Political Economy of Reform) :
While there is hysteresis in Eastern homeownership there is no hysteresis in East’s
homeownership rate. Advising a seemingly harmless small rent reduction in Ger-
many’s East has to contend with two fears on the part of Eastern homeowners:
(i) having to contribute to the resulting small public housing de￿cit now (ii) joint
with seeing homeowner majority erode (producing even greater public housing de￿cits
later).
5 Conclusions
The paper argues that neither level nor persistence of rent and homeownership rate
are accidental. They are features of a political economy equilibrium instead. The
paper also argues that no rent reduction is likely to occur in Germany’s East. East
Germany’s risen homeownership rate acts as a ratchet, ￿petrifying￿ East’s excessive
rent. In equilibrium, modernization is intense, homeownership one half, vacant hous-
ing vast, and large rent persistent. Further, even a modest proposal of reducing rent
25Immigrants from Germany’s West are unlikely to buy a house in Germany’s East. This as-
sumption mirrors our earlier assumption that emigrants from Germany’s East do not buy a home
in Germany’s West.
26...and may further explain why advising even only modest changes in Eastern rent (Dascher
(2005, 2008b)) has produced no response at all.
15only slightly must meet ￿erce resistance by the homeowner majority in place. Home-
owners must fear that even a slight rent reduction will result in losing their majority
of the Eastern electorate.
A large literature suggests that homeownership makes households internalize many
of their neighborhood-related actions.27 In particular, the belief that ￿homeowners
are better citizens￿ underlies many countries’ housing policies. In suggesting that
homeowners in Germany’s West may be responsible for excessive rent in East this
paper in part sides with the small literature questioning the bene￿cial role of a high
homeownership rate. Oswald (1996, 1999), for instance, argues that more pervasive
owner-occupiership may reduce household mobility, and hence be responsible for
greater labor market mismatch.
On the technical side, note that our endogenizing  (in section 3) and r (in section
4) in fact amounts to setting up a four stage game. At the ￿rst stage Western
homeowners pick cost rent. At the second stage Eastern households simultaneously
choose whether to leave, and if not, how to live. At the third stage Eastern households
simultaneously vote on whether to default on modernization debt. And at the fourth
and last stage households in East and West produce, trade and consume. The model’s
equilibrium set out in Proposition 2 just represents the solution identi￿ed through
backward induction.28
Throughout the paper West Germany’s landlords do not bene￿t from rising rent in
East. Yet what if West Germany’s landlords also owned homes in East Germany? 29
SAB (2008, 61), monitoring public housing demolition in the East German Bundes-
land of Saxony, argues that ￿many landlords (of private rental housing, neglected
in this paper) in Germany’s East are in fact absentee, living in Germany’s West.￿
Possibly, West Germany’s interfering with East Germany’s rent may also be driven
by a much more direct motive than that of manipulating the homeownership rate.
Finally, note that while this paper’s model says nothing about East Germany’s labor
market, an extension quite possibly could. Larger housing rent may carry over into
larger commercial rent. While commercial rent so far plays no role in the controversy
over East’s failure to catch up (as in e.g., Snower/Merkl (2006) or Uhlig (2006)), com-
mercial rent certainly plays a key role in the large literature on regional development
(Roback (1982)). From this literature’s perspective, excessive rent would place an
extra burden on local ￿rms. Demand for, and employment of, East German labor
might well be lower than they otherwise could be. Such an extension would address
27For an overview see Glaeser/diPasquale (1999).
28Rather than setting up the full model right from the start, this paper has pursued a ￿slower￿
approach, introducing additional stages one by one. This may facilitate agreeing with the early
results of the paper (sections 2 through 3) without necessarily having to agree with its later results
(section 4).
29Following Sinn/Sinn (1994), this is plausible (i) given that many houses in Germany’s East
were left behind by those leaving before the Berlin wall was built, and subsequently reclaimed after
reuni￿cation, and (ii) given that many West Germans heavily invested into East German property
after 1991.
16not only housing resources wasted but also macroeconomic bene￿ts foregone.
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